We investigate the effects of inward FDI on income distribution and absolute living standards in Vietnam using census data from 1989-2009. We compute the number of employees of foreign establishments in each of Vietnam's provinces for each year, and use that as a measure of local FDI. We estimate the effects of FDI on local households' living standards as reported in the data, broken down by educational background to allow us to analyze effects on inequality. Estimates based on the repeated cross section indicate that rising FDI in a province is associated with a slight decline in living standards for households there if they do not have a member employed by the foreign enterprises, with only modest gains for households who do have a member employed by the foreign enterprises. These estimates may reflect composition effects, however, since we find large movements of people toward the provinces receiving the FDI. The findings show that measuring the effect of FDI on household welfare is more difficult than measuring the effect of trade policy, and may pose a difficulty for the view of FDI as a general anti-poverty strategy.
Introduction
OECD countries, and not least both the US and Japan, have embraced FDI as a primary tool of economic development in low-wage economies, and even perhaps as a more important tool than Official Development Aid. However, there has been much debate over the effects of FDI on the host economies, and particularly its effects on income inequality. Perhaps the most important channel by which FDI can affect income inequality is by shifting the demand for labor. In principle, FDI could either raise or lower income inequality in this To address the effect of FDI on income inequality in Vietnam, we use data from the 1989 to 2009 Population and Housing Census (hereafter, the 'Census'), each of which records the industry and province of employment for each worker, as well as an unusual piece of information that is crucial for the question at hand: whether the worker is employed in a private entity, state enterprise, or foreign-owned enterprise. The amount of FDI into each industry and province can be computed by adding up the number of workers in foreignowned entities. This is available for 1999 and 2009, so our regressions focus on those years (using some information from 1989 for initial conditions).
If the Census also provided wage data, a Mincer wage regression could then be used to establish whether or not the skilled wage premium has moved systematically together with FDI inflows either by industry or by province, and in what direction. Specifically, controlling for all available personal characteristics, a measure of the worker's skill level could be interacted with the number of foreign-owned enterprise jobs in the province.
This would allow us to test for the possibility that a hiring surge by multinationals in a particular location has an effect on skill premia, and we could estimate it both for those actually employed in the foreign sector and for those outside of it.
Unfortunately, wage data were not collected by the Census, so indirect methods are required. The Census does ask a wide variety of questions that can be used to gauge a household's standard of living. Does the household have access to piped water? Is it piped into the household's dwelling? Does the household have access to electricity? Does it own a radio? A television? What is the rate of child mortality? These can be observed over time to see if people living in a province that saw a greater FDI inflow also were more likely to see a measurable improvement in living standards as measured in these basic amenities. In addition, we can look for a differential effect by education: Were households with more high-school-educated adults, for example, more likely to see an improvement in their living conditions, in provinces with a large FDI inflow, compared to those with less education? Is there any educational class that saw a worsening in living conditions, or a slower improvement relative to other groups, when more FDI is present?
This allows us to measure the pure general-equilibrium effect of FDI on local income inequality operating through its effect on labor demand. This approach can also be used to examine the effect of FDI on the absolute level of local real income, assuming that all of the amenities in question are normal goods.
Before turning to our approach in detail, we will review some of the main theoretical ideas and existing literature.
Theoretical ideas
There are many reasons inward FDI could increase income inequality and many reasons it could have the opposite effect. Here we mention three different mechanisms as examples.
(i) Inward FDI could compete with domestic capital for domestic workers, pushing down the income of domestic capitalists and raising the incomes of domestic workers. This is the idea behind the political argument of Pandya (2014) that the median voter should typically be in favor of policies to welcome FDI. One simple model in which this outcome emerges is as follows. Home is a small open economy with multiple industries, each producing some tradable output by combining labor and capital with constant returns to scale. The capital for each industry is sector-specific, meaning that it can be used only for that industry, and it is available in a fixed amount. There is an exogenous supply of homogeneous workers, who can switch from one industry to another costlessly. Each citizen has one unit of labor, but some in addition own some capital, creating income inequality. An increase in inward FDI to any of the industries raises the marginal product of labor in that industry, raising 5 aggregate labor demand and the equilibrium wage. This decreases income per unit of capital in each industry (since output prices are determined on world markets and remain unchanged). As a result, incomes of low-income citizens (who have only labor income) rise proportionally more than the incomes of higher-income citizens (who receive income gains on their labor but income reductions on their capital). In this model, inward FDI unambiguously reduces income inequality.
(ii) Inward FDI could shift the mix of tasks performed in the economy in the direction of increased skill intensity. This mechanism is developed in detail in Feenstra and Hanson (1996) (a similar story with a slightly different mechanism emerges in Zhu and Trefler (2005) ; and Raveh and Reshef (2014) ). In that model, there is one manufactured good that requires a continuum of inputs to produce. Each input requires high-skilled labor, low-skilled labor and capital to produce, and can be produced either in North or in South.
Each country has an exogenous endowment of all three factors, and the ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled labor is higher in North. The inputs differ in the ratio of high-skilled and low-skilled labor required to produce them.
In equilibrium, the ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled wages is higher in South, so it is more expensive to produce very skilled-labor intensive inputs in the South than in the North, and vice versa for very low-skilled-labor intensive inputs. Therefore, there is a cutoff input such that inputs that are more skilled-labor-intensive than the cutoff are produced in North and less skilled-labor-intensive inputs are produced in South. Now, if FDI transfers some capital from North to South, the cutoff input changes: The increased productivity of Southern labor expands the range of inputs produced in the South, so that the new cutoff is more skill-labor intensive than the old one. Consequently, the least skilled-labor intensive inputs that had previously been produced in North are now produced in South, where they become the most skilled-labor intensive inputs produced in South. As a result, the relative demand for skilled labor goes up in both countries, increasing wage inequality.
The result is that in this model, inward FDI reduces the income of South's capitalists, which in and of itself lowers inequality; but it increases wage inequality, which pushes in the other direction.
(iii) Inward FDI could be more or less skill intensive than domestic businesses in its own demand for labor. Consider the following illustrative model. Home is a small open economy, with a range of industries, each producing a traded good combining skilled and unskilled labor with constant returns to scale. To keep the argument as simple as possible, suppose that all of these industries have the same production function. 1 In addition, there is a sector that requires foreign capital to produce, in combination with both kinds of labor. Think, for example, of an oil field that requires foreign technology to exploit, or an assembly operation that will use foreign machines plus local labor to produce products for export. For simplicity, suppose that the foreign-capital-using sector uses skilled workers in a fixed ratio, S F , to unskilled, and that all capital is foreign-owned.
Suppose that initially there is no foreign capital at all, and the economy's exogenous ratio of skilled to unskilled labor isS. Now, allow a small amount of inward FDI, so that the foreign-capital-using sector begins hiring local workers, S F skilled workers for each unskilled worker. If S F >S, the labor left over for the domestic industries has a lower ratio of skilled to unskilled workers thanS, and so the skilled-to-unskilled wage ratio must rise to induce domestic employers to substitute toward unskilled workers and restore labor-market clearing. The result is a rise in wage inequality (which in this illustrative model is also a rise in overall inequality). In this case, FDI reduces the absolute wages of the unskilled workers as well, since in each domestic firm the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers, and hence the marginal product of unskilled labor, will fall. If S F <S, inequality is reduced, and real incomes of unskilled workers are increased, due to FDI, following the same logic.
The former case could be quite plausible in the case of extractive industries; perhaps a new oil well will require 1 engineer, 1 supervisor, and 20 manual workers; but if the typical domestic employer has 1 supervisor for 100 manual workers, the oil well removes from the domestic economy skilled workers who would normally employ 200 manual workers, while providing new jobs in the foreign-capital-using sector for only 20 of them. The resulting net decrease in unskilled labor demand requires a drop in unskilled wages to restore equilibrium.
The opposite outcome is more likely for an assembly operation, where the skilled-unskilled ratio might be comparable to or even below the domestic-sector average.
These three examples are by no means exhaustive. Indeed, there is now a rich theoretical literature on the relationship between trade and inequality (Harrison, McLaren and McMillan, 2011) , and any one of those models would have its own implications for the effect of FDI on inequality. These examples merely illustrate the point that there can be no theoretical presumption regarding whether inward FDI will raise or lower income inequality, whether it will raise or lower the real incomes of low-skilled workers, or whether it will raise or lower poverty rates. Only empirical enquiry can answer these questions.
Literature review
A broad literature investigates the relationship between FDI and income inequality. Macro approaches are exemplified by Jaumotte et al (2008) , who use panel data for 51 countries over 1981-2003 and find a positive effect of FDI on income inequality but a negative effect of trade. Im and McLaren (2015) suggest that such findings may be due to the endogeneity of FDI, and find a negative effect on inequality, once FDI inflows are instrumented by a range of variables. Raveh and Reshef (2014) examine the effects of capital imports on the skill premium in wage data for a wide panel of countries, using changes in unit prices of different types of capital as instruments. They find that the composition of capital imports is more important than the quantity of capital imports, with more R&D intensive capital imports promoting increased skilled-wage premia.
Micro studies tend to examine the effect of FDI on wages in the host country. Lipsey This study is also related to the literature that assesses the effects of globalization by exploiting intra-national geographic variation in its effects. Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) studied the effect of the mid-1990's liberalization of rice exports in Vietnam on child labor, by using variation in the effect on rice prices across different locations within the country. 
Empirical Approach
Our outcome variables are observed at the household level, so all of our individual-level data needs to be aggregated to the household level. Given a household h living in province i in year t, consider an outcome variable y h . This could be a dummy variable for the presence of a television in the household, for example. Once we condition on h, we do not need to condition on i or t, because each household in the sample is observed in only one year of the data, and of course lives in only one province. It will be useful to write i(h) and t(h) for the location and year of observation, respectively, of household h.
Given that we have no income variables, the simplest way to measure the effect of FDI in the local labor market would be through a regression of the following sort:
Here, n h is the number of members in the household; n j h is the number of adult members of educational class j, where j takes one of four values, indicating that the highest level of education achieved is either 'less than primary,' 'primary,' 'secondary,' or 'university;' , so this would demonstrate that even those who are not themselves hired by foreign firms nonetheless benefit from the increased local demand for labor that the foreign firms create.
A comment on how to interpret the demographic coefficients may be in order. Increasing n j h , holding n h constant, implies exchanging one working-age adult with education j for one child or senior citizen. Therefore, each of the β j 2 coefficients measures the effect of a reduction in the household's dependency ratio, with higher values of j implying higher levels of education for the working-age member in question. On the other hand, an increase in n h , holding the n j h variables constant, implies addition of one non-working-age dependent to the household, whose effect is measured by β 1 . Now, equation (1) is framed as if an increase in FDI will have the same effect for all households in the same province, but of course that may not be the case, and indeed the discussion above indicates that there are many reasons FDI might affect the real incomes of households with different human capital to different degrees, or even in different directions.
We can investigate such differences with the modified equation as follows:
The difference from (1) An obvious problem with this approach is the possible endogeneity of foreign hiring.
This could arise for many reasons. For example, if a province receives a new highway or an improved electrical grid, that could increase incomes and living standards throughout the province, and at the same time make the province more attractive for foreign investment.
If there are enough shocks of that sort, a spurious positive correlation between foreign hiring and living standards will be induced, and regressions of the sort we are using will overstate any benefit from the foreign hiring. On the other hand, during this period the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) sector contracted very rapidly as market reforms proceeded (McCaig and Pavcnik (2013, pp. 13-14) ). In a province with a heavy concentration of SOE's, the reduction in labor demand from that sector could in and of itself reduce wages and living standards, but that same reduction in wages would also make the province more attractive to foreign enterprises. If there are enough shocks of that sort, a spurious negative correlation between foreign hiring and living standards will be induced, and regressions of the sort we are using will understate any benefit from the foreign hiring. Many such possible correlations between foreign hiring and omitted variables can be contemplated.
To deal with this issue, we have explore two different instrumental variable strategies as follows.
(i) A shift-share approach. We can construct a simple instrumental variable as follows.
For each industry k, we construct from the Census data the share θ k i of that industry's total jobs nationwide that are located in province i as of 1989. 3 Then, for year t = {1999, 2009}, we sum up the total foreign employment nationwide in industry k for year
This is analogous to a standard instrument, variously called a 'shift-share' or 'supply-push' instrument, used in the immigration literature to deal with the endogeneity of immigrant inflows as popularized by Card (2001) . It should be uncorrelated with local productivity and labor-demand shocks subsequent to 1989, but correlated with local foreign hiring to the extent that a multinational enterprise will prefer to hire, other things equal, in locations where that firm's industry has already established itself.
(ii) An approach based on foreign supply of FDI. An alternative approach is based on data from foreign FDI outflows. For countries that are major suppliers of FDI, we can define outf low k t as the outflow of FDI worldwide in industry k and year t. We can then define IV F S i,t ≡ k θ k i outf low k t . This can be called a 'foreign supply' instrument, and is analogous to the instrument used by Hummels et al (2014) for offshoring by Danish firms.
A difficulty that has plagued both approaches is that for most specifications the IV's produced tend to be weak, with first-stage F-statistics well below 10. Trial and error has led us to use the 'foreign-supply' specification constructed from outward FDI from Japan, lagged 2 years. It is not surprising that this is the strongest instrument, since Japan has been by far the largest source of FDI to Vietnam (although Vietnam makes up a small share of Japan's FDI). Our only criterion has been to find the IV method that produces the strongest first stage, as measured by the first-stage F-statistic. As reported at the bottom of our results tables, the F-statistic tends to range from just over 3 to 7 with this approach.
Data
We use the 1989, 1999 and 2009 Vietnam Population and Housing Census, from which we have an anonymized 5%, 3% and 15% sample respectively, taken from the Integrated Public Use Micro Samples system (IPUMS) (Ruggles et al (2010) ). 4 As Table 1 presents, we Our data include a wide range of standard-of-living variables at the household level, which we will use as the outcome variables in question. The summary statistics are provided in Table 2 . Most of these are dummy variables, i.e., whether the household has an access to electricity, etc. However, 'Living area in square meters' and 'Child deaths' are integers.
We define these briefly: (i) Electricity. Indicates whether or not the household has access to electricity. We have had to omit data on a number of other interesting living-standard variables because they are not available for both 1999 and 2009. These include: access to a sewage system or septic tank; presence of a telephone within the dwelling; air conditioning; personal computer; clothes-washing machine; refrigerator; number of rooms; and number of bedrooms.
These amenities vary widely in the breadth of their availability. For example, in our data, 94% of households have access to electricity, while 23.6% have a radio. Only 21% have access to piped water, but 81.6% have a television. The average dwelling is 67 square meters (about 710 square feet) in size.
Results
The results from equation (1) estimated with OLS are shown in Table 3 . Each column presents results from a regression with a different dependent variable. Each row lists estimated coefficients from a different regressor, which are in order: Foreign-employed in province, the number of adults employed by foreign enterprises in the province and year in which the household is located (FOR_i(h),t(h) above); Size of household, the number of people of any age in the household (n h above); Adults without primary education, the number of adults with less than primary education (n LT P h above); Adults with primary school, the number of adults with primary education (n P ri h above); High-school graduates, the number of adults with secondary education (n Sec h above); College graduates, the number of adults with university education (n U niv h above); Foreign-employed in household, the number of adults in the household employed by a foreign enterprise (n F OR h above); and U rban, a dummy variable indicating that the household lives in an urban location. Each regression has year and province fixed effects, and all standard errors are clustered at the province level.
Note that in controlling for the regressors in rows 3 through 6, we are controlling for the number of working-age adults in the household, so the second row shows the effect of an increase in the number of non-working age household members, holding the number of working-age adults constant. Looking at the results in the second row, we see that an increase in the size of the household is associated with a small increase in living area (about three square meters, perhaps the size of a closet), but otherwise is associated with reduced living standards suggesting that the household budget needs to be stretched further to accommodate the additional dependent. For example, one more non-working-age member is associated with a one-percentage-point reduction in the probability of a toilet in the house. The one exception to this pattern is a small increase in the probability that the household has a radio or TV.
Turning to the human-capital variables, note that the coefficient on n j h implies the effect of one more working-age adult of education class j, holding household-size fixed. This effect is in most cases positive for all four educational classes except for the first one, indicating that, holding household size constant, one more working-age adult tends to improve living standards, unless that adult has less than primary education. The coefficients mostly increase as one moves down the column, indicating that having more education has a bigger impact on the living standard. One more uneducated adult is associated with a 1.7 percentage point reduction in the probability that the household has electricity, and a 5 percentage-point reduction in the probability of having a flush toilet. On the other hand, one more university-educated adult is associated with an increased living space of 16 square meters, enough for an extra bedroom, and is associated with a 14.5 percentage-point increase in the probability that the household has a flush toilet. Importantly, adding highschool or college-educated adults to the household reduces child mortality, by approximately 1 percentage point (in other words, one less child death with a probability of 1%).
The U rban variable is correlated with improvements in living standards along all fronts.
Controlling for all other factors, an urban household is 6. The overall pattern of the control variables is consistent with a story in which one more dependent causes the household to spend a bit more on housing but to sacrifice living standards along other dimensions, while one more working-age adult tends to be associated with improvements along all dimensions as long as the adult has some education, and dramatically so if he or she has university education, as does urban status.
We turn now to the main variable of interest, the foreign employment in the household's province, which recall is normalized by the province's 1989 population. There is a great deal of variance in the number of people employed by foreign enterprises, both across provinces and across time. For our purposes, the time-series variation is the most important, which we can measure as the standard deviation across provinces of the first difference in the foreign employment in a given province. This standard deviation is 0.14.
We will interpret regression results in terms of this standard deviation. We do not wish to pin too much on the OLS regressions because of the endogeneity problem. Table 4 reports the results for the IV version of the regression. Clearly, the negative findings for the number of foreign jobs in the province are greatly strengthened.
Three variables are now statistically significant, two of which indicate a worsening of living standards when foreign hiring increases. The exception is living space, which increases by 8.4 square meters when foreign hiring goes up by one standard deviation -perhaps enough space for one small room. Access to electricity and a TV fall by about 23 and 12
percentage points respectively with a one-standard-deviation increase in foreign hiring. For households who have a member who gets one of the foreign-enterprise jobs, there are two bright spots -an increased probability of a flush toilet and a drop in child mortality -but the magnitudes are negligible, and there is no increase in living space. (It is possible that this is due to people moving into a dormitory to take a foreign-sector job. The results are essentially unchanged when households with a foreign-sector employee are removed from the sample). Note that the worsening of the estimates of the effect of foreign hiring on household welfare suggests that the first endogeneity story discussed in Section 2 fits better -omitted variables that improve living standards also attract FDI.
To sum up, a rise in local hiring by multinationals is associated with slightly reduced living standards, even if the household itself has a member who takes one of the foreign jobs.
We turn now to the results from estimation of equation (2), to see if we can infer anything about inequality. These results are reported for OLS in Table 5 and for the IV regression in Table 6 , which are set up exactly as Tables 3 and 4 More non-working-age members cause the household to allocate resources toward living area and away from other uses. More education and living in the city both improve living standards including reducing child mortality. The effect of having a household member employed by a foreign employer has mixed effects on living standards, and is correlated with reduced living area.
In this case, it is more difficult to find any appreciable effect on living standards due to foreign hiring. In the OLS results, there is a small negative effect on access to electricity, significant only for workers with a primary education, and very small in magnitude (a onestandard-deviation increase in foreign hiring is associated with about a third of a percentage point decrease). For toilets, there is a minuscule increase in access for uneducated workers, and a similarly-sized drop for educated workers. There is a significant rise in probability of a flush toilet (0.431×0.14 = 0.09,) of 9 percentage points per standard-deviation increase in foreign hiring, which disappears in households who have one university graduate -perhaps because those households already have a flush toilet regardless of foreign hiring. There are very small reductions in child mortality. However, most of these effects become insignificant in the IV regressions.
The effect of having a household member employed by a foreign enterprise, recorded in row 7, is very similar to what it was for equation (1); very small, and a mixed bag. Foreign employment improves access to a flush toilet by about half a percentage point.
To sum up, a rise in local hiring by multinationals is associated with slightly reduced living standards, slightly less so for a household with very low education, and with small improvements if the household itself has a member who takes one of the foreign jobs.
Allowing for heterogeneous effects
The effects of foreign hiring estimated above were almost uniformly quite small. Note that this cannot be because the data are simply noisy and uninformative, since a number of strong effects came through for other variables, such as household size, education, and urban location. Here we look more closely at some forms of heterogeneity that may have been obscuring the effects.
(i) Gender. We have not to this point paid any attention to gender. However, it is quite conceivable that male-led households and female-led households respond differently to the presence of foreign hiring. We do not have any meaningful indicator of household leader in our Census data, but we do have both the gender and the education level of each household member. In Table 7 , we extend equation (2) to allow for a count of both male and female family members at each education level. The second row shows the effect of the number of male household members, and the third row the number of female household members. Similarly, each subsequent row corresponds to a row from Tables 5 and 6 , but with the count of male members first and the corresponding count of female members next.
As before, the table is estimated by IV, with province and year fixed effects and clustering at the provincial level.
Two striking points emerge. First, the variables for the two genders appear to have very similar effects. Almost throughout, the sign of the variables for men and women is the same and the magnitudes are similar. For example, one more boy in the household increases child mortality by 0.3 percentage points, and one more girl by 0.5 percentage points. One more man with a university degree reduces child mortality by 0.7 percentage points, and one more woman with the degree reduces it by 0.9 percentage points. Second, the effects of foreign hiring in the province are once again very weak. The only significant effects are very small increases in the probability of having a television, and reductions in living area. These do not differ by gender in any interesting way.
(ii) The average effect. In our main regressions, we controlled for the number of workers each household had who were employed by foreign employers, in order to isolate the direct effect of foreign employment from its indirect effect on the local labor market. However, if we wish to identify the average effect, it is desirable to do the estimation without controlling for the household's own foreign employment. It is also possible that trying to estimate the direct and indirect effect at the same time diluted the identification, resulting in only very small effects being observed. To address these issues, we also have performed the estimation without controlling for the household's own foreign-employed members. The results, for equation (1) with the IV and clustering as before, are reported in the first panel of Table   8 , with only the right-hand-side variables of interest included.
The results show much the same story as before: Modest effects, indicating a slight drop in living standards. We find a 22 percentage-point reduction in access to electricity for the average household, and a small increase in living space of about 8 square meters, associated with a one-standard-deviation increase in foreign hiring. There is also a small drop in television ownership.
(iii) The urban-rural divide. Throughout, we have controlled for urban residence, but we have not allowed for the possibility that the response of an urban household to foreign hiring may be different from the response of a rural one. This could be crucial: Given that foreign hiring is concentrated in the urban areas, it may well be that all of the response in concentrated in the urban areas, and by pooling all households we have obscured the effect. The two remaining panels of Table 8 show, respectively, the estimation results for the sample of rural households only, and urban households only. Once again, this is equation
(1), with IV and clustering as before, and the other regressors suppressed to save space.
The urban results are indeed stronger than the rural ones, but, perhaps surprisingly, they are stronger in a negative direction. Most strikingly, the probability of having a flush toilet rises by 41 percentage points for a rural household with a one-standard-deviation increase in the province's foreign hiring, while for an urban household the same probability falls by 28 percentage points. For an urban household, the probability of connection to electricity falls by 6 percentage points, while the effect for a rural household is very imprecisely estimated.
The results are surprising and somewhat enigmatic, but they certainly show that the failure to find beneficial effects of foreign hiring is not due to pooling of rural and urban households.
Migration
As a final exercise, we look at the effect of FDI on the movement of people. If FDI raises living standards in a province, and mobility is not prohibitively costly, it is likely that the population of the province will respond as a result, as people move to that province to take advantage of the new opportunities. This can be an alternative test for living standards effects; if people vote with their feet, they may reveal living-standards effects indirectly that are difficult to measure directly. Table 9 
, where L i is total effective labor allocated to industry i, or the integral of the a z,i terms of all workers employed there; K i is the industry's capital; and F i is a concave constant-returns-to-scale production function. The price p i of industry i output is fixed on world markets and can be taken as given. With competitive markets, the price of effective labor in each industry is the marginal value product of effective labor,
where a subscript denotes partial differentiation, and so the wage of a worker in i is equal Suppose now that FDI exogenously increases the stock of capital in industry X. It is easy to verify that this will increase r X , r Y , and r X r Y , as well as causing some workers who otherwise would have chosen sector Y to switch to X, raising L X and lowering L Y . 9 One consequence is a reduction in the average productivity of workers in the X industry, in the sense of a z,X , as workers with a weaker comparative advantage in that industry choose employment in it. 10 The rise in r X tends to pull wages in X up, but the fall in average a z,X works in the opposite direction.
It is easy to construct examples in which average wages in X fall in equilibrium as a result of the FDI, because the selection effect of lower average a z,X values overwhelms the labor-demand effect of the rise in r X . For example, consider the case in which industry Y does not use capital and the production functions are (so L X = 10). Now, if the FDI raises K X to 11, the equilibrium will have all workers in X.
The effective units of labor in X will be 10 units due to the 'talented' workers plus 1 unit 9 A worker z will choose sector X if r Y . First, if this ratio is unchanged after the FDI, the labor allocation will be unchanged, but this is a contradiction since in that case
If r X r Y falls, labor will move from X to Y , but that will imply, due to the effect on the marginal products of labor, that r X rises and r Y falls, providing a contradiction. The only possibility is that rises, that implies a rise in r X as well. 10 Note that conditional on any value of a z,Y , the worker who is indifferent between the two industries is the worker whose value of a z,X is the greatest lower bound to the set of a z,X values for workers who choose X. Consequently, when r X r Y rises, the workers who switch from Y to X are the lowest-a z,X workers for each value of a z,Y . They thus bring down the average value of a z,X conditional on a z,Y for each value of a z,Y . Therefore, the unconditional average value of a z,X for workers employed in X also falls.
due to the 'ordinary' workers for a total of L X = 11. The marginal product of labor will be unchanged in both industries, but the average value of a z,X in the X industry will have fallen from 10 to 5.5, and so the average real wage in X will have fallen sharply. (Before and after the FDI, 'ordinary' workers are indifferent between the two industries.)
Now, consider a slightly larger infusion of FDI, which leaves K X at a value slightly above 11. Now, all workers strictly prefer industry X. It is still the case that average wages in X have fallen due to the FDI, due to the massive influx of untalented workers to that industry. However, note that in this case, as in all cases with this sort of model, the 
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Concluding Remarks
We have investigated the effect of FDI, measured by hiring by foreign enterprises, on standards of living and inequality in Vietnam. Our sample is a random draw from the Vietnamese decennial census, which gives us a series of cross sections of the population.
Using the full, repeated cross-section sample, after correcting for the endogeneity of FDI, we find consistently that increased foreign hiring in a province is associated with small reductions in living standards for households whose members are not employees of the foreign firms. In particular, once endogeneity of FDI is controlled for, access to electricity falls by more than 20 percentage points when local foreign hiring rises by one standard deviation. Whether this reflects extra strain on the local power grid due to extra demand for power by multinationals, or some other mechanism, is a question beyond our ability to answer within this study. Workers hired by the foreign firms see very minor increases in living standards. The results are changed in details but not in their broad contours when we allow for heterogeneous response by education level, gender, or rural/urban status.
However, the failure to find benefits for the local population from FDI could stem from a number of sources. In our main regressions, our instrumental variables are on the weak side at best. We are limited in our geographic detail to the province only; it would be desirable to have metropolitan areas or commuting zones, but these are not available in the Vietnamese Census. This may mask crucial geographic variation and stymie identification. 
(8) 
